Traco Steel Erectors Inc. v. Comtrol Inc. : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Traco Steel Erectors Inc. v. Comtrol Inc. : Reply
Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Cass C. Butler; Michael D. Stanger; Callister Nebeker and McCullough; Attorney for Appellee.
Ralph R. Tate; Stephen B. Doxey; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Traco Steel Erectors v. Comtrol, No. 20060916 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6871
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TRACO STEEL ERECTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
COMTROL, INC., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF FROM APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20060916-CA 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
CASS C. BUTLER 
MICHAEL D. STANGER 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough 
Attorney for Appellee Comtrol, Inc. 
Gateway Tower East Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
RALPH R.TATE (#3192) 
STEPHEN B. DOXEY (#4560) 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. 
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
JUN 1 t 2007 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
TRACO STEEL ERECTORS, INC., 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
COMTROL, INC., 
Defendant and Appellee. 
REPLY BRIEF FROM APPELLANT 
Appellate Case No. 20060916-CA 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
JUDGE TYRONE E. MEDLEY 
CASS C. BUTLER 
MICHAEL D. STANGER 
Callister Nebeker & McCullough 
Attorney for Appellee Comtrol, Inc. 
Gateway Tower East Suite 900 
10 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
RALPH R.TATE (#3192) 
STEPHEN B. DOXEY (#4560) 
Attorneys for Appellant 
Traco Steel Erectors, Inc. 
4625 South 2300 East, Suite 206 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
-ii-
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT REPLYING TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF 1 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 3 
ARGUMENT 5 
1. THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE AS IT PERTAINS TO THE 
SPECIFIC ISSUES ON APPEAL HAS BEEN PROPERLY 
MARSHALED PURSUANT TO RULE 24(A) 9 OF THE UTAH 
RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 5 
2. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED DAMAGES 
DRAMATICALLY IN EXCESS OF THAT WHICH WOULD 
MAKE COMTROL WHOLE 7 
A. Traco Properly Marshaled Evidence Pertaining to the Trial 
Court's Error in Awarding Excessive Damages 7 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Determining the Anticipatory Breach 
of Contract by Comtrol Was Not Significant 13 
3. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES INVOLVING THE ARMY 
RESERVE CONTRACT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE 
THERE WERE FACTUAL DISPUTES INVOLVING (A) 
WHETHER THERE WAS AN AGREEMENT FOR AN ACCORD 
AND SATISFACTION SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION; 
AND (B) WHETHER THERE WAS A UNILATERAL OR 
MUTUAL MISTAKE AS TO A CONTRACT BALANCE 15 
4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
SERVICES RENDERED BY TRACO IN COMPLETING THE 
WORK OF ANOTHER SUBCONTRACTOR (DWAMCO) DID 
NOT ARISE UNDER EITHER A CONTRACT WITH COMTROL 
OR WITH DWAMCO OR OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF THE 
ORIGINAL COMTROL CONTRACT 17 
-111-
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF THE 
CONTRACTUAL EFFECT OF INTERIM LIEN WAIVERS 22 
CONCLUSION 24 
ADDENDUM 
J. Defendant's Exhibits 12 and 63 - Lien Waivers 
-iv-
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Automatic Control Products Corp. v. Tel-Tech. Inc.. 780, P.2d 1258 (Utah 1989) . . . . 11 
Christensen v. Christensen. 605 P.2d 80 (Idaho 1979) 12 
Christiansen v. Holiday Rent-A-Car. 845 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1992), 
certiorari denied 853 P.2d 897 12 
Even Odds. Inc. v. Nielson. 448 P.2d 709 (Utah 1968) 12 
Fleming v. Scott, 348 P.2d 701 (Colo. 1960) 12 
Harris v. IES Associates. Inc.. 2003 UT App.l 12, 69 P.3d 297 22 
Miller Pontiac. Inc. v. Osborne. 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981) 15 
S&G. Inc. v. Intermtn Power Agency. 913 P.2d 735 (Utah 1996) 16 
Saunders v. Sharp. 840 P.2d 796 (Utah 1992) 12 
-1-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT REPLYING TO APPELLEE'S BRIEF 
Appellee Comtrol's brief does not specifically dispute the facts as presented in 
Traco's brief. Traco limited its appeal to specific narrow issues. Traco marshaled the 
evidence using Comtrol's own exhibits and the testimony of Comtrol's own witnesses. 
Traco and Comtrol disagree as to whether material facts are adequately marshaled so that 
this Court can evaluate whether the trial court's fact findings were clearly erroneous. 
The extent of the marshaling is identified in this reply brief. 
The trial court rejected Traco's claim of an anticipatory breach by Comtrol and 
determined there was a breach of contract on the part of Traco. Traco has requested a 
reversal on the issue of anticipatory breach. However, in any event, the trial court 
incorrectly calculated Comtrol's costs to complete its contract with Traco and awarded 
substantially excessive damages.. 
The measure of damages in breach of contract cases is an amount that would place 
the non-defaulting party in a position it would have enjoyed had a breach not occurred. 
The trial court's judgment places Comtrol in a significantly more advantageous position 
than that for which it had contracted. 
Comtrol's damages completing the contract should not exceed the amount of costs 
it incurred, including actual wages and labor burden, together with reasonable overhead 
and reasonable profit as contractually agreed between the parties and as testified to by 
Comtrol's officers. Comtrol's damage claim was based on a national average of costs 
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which sum was approximately double the actual costs Comtrol incurred in completing the 
work. The trial court inappropriately declined to admit subpoenaed payroll documents 
and determined Comtrol's damages using a wrong standard of evidence. When the 
evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Comtrol, there was manifest error in the 
standard that the court used resulting in excessive damages being awarded.. 
The second major issue addressed in Comtrol's reply brief pertains to a contract 
involving an Army Reserve Center. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to 
Comtrol. However, significant issues of fact should have precluded summary judgment. 
Traco has enumerated several factual disputes. Comtrol claims that an account balance 
carried forth on a back charge constituted an accord and satisfaction. Traco's president 
claims that the balance was in error. Traco also claimed there was no new consideration 
or meeting of the minds which are necessary elements for an accord and satisfaction. 
The next issue involves whether the trial court erred in interpreting contractual 
provisions when it found that work performed by Traco correcting steel fabrication 
defects of another of Comtrol's subcontractors (Dwamco) was neither part of a contract 
nor a contract with Dwaco. The court issued inconsistent rulings on this issue. Traco's 
services correcting the misfabricated steel were performed as directed by Comtrol's 
superintendent. Traco maintains the work was performed outside the scope of the 
original contract with Comtrol and therefore should be interpreted by the Court in 
accordance with ordinary rules of contract interpretation. Traco claims it should have 
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been entitled to recover payment from Comtrol for the value of said work. The 
interpretation of said contract should be reviewed by the Court under a standard of 
correctness. 
The other major issue involves whether interim lien releases barred claims for 
labor and materials on the overall project. Both parties agree that retention payments 
were not intended to be subject to the lien release. Traco asserts that the interim lien 
release constitutes a release for the amount of the payment of sums received, but was not 
a release of specific items of work performed. 
The interpretation of these issues will alter the determination of the prevailing 
party which would affect the award of attorney fees granted by the trial court. 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL 
Most of Comtrol's "Additional Statements of Fact Relevant to Issues on Appeal" 
simply repeat the trial court's findings of fact which were prepared by Comtrol. (A copy 
of the complete findings of fact is attached to Traco's initial brief.) However, Comtrol 
adds some alleged statements of fact in its brief as items 9 through 17 pertaining to the 
U.S. Army Reserve project contract which are not facts determined by the court. Several 
of these alleged facts were clearly refuted by Tracy Bronson in his Affidavit. (A copy of 
the Bronson Affidavit was attached as Exhibit B in the addendum of Traco's opening 
brief.) Issues claimed to be fact in Comtrol's brief that need to be clarified include: 
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1. Comtrol claims that the Army Reserve contract was for $42,100. Actually, 
the contract price was $46,000 if Traco provided the crane, or $42,100 if Comtrol 
provided the crane. (R. at 283 and Contract at R. at 190.) 
2. Comtrol subsequently added $3,900 to the $42,100 contract and then back 
charged $9,520 to Traco because Comtrol provided the crane. This is contrary to the 
contract between the parties. (R. at 212; R. at 283, Bronson Affidavit.) Comtrol's 
president testified in his deposition that the contract required Comtrol to provide the 
crane. Brian Burk's deposition on pages 17-18 reads as follows: 
Page 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Page 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
17, Lines 19-25 
Q. So the ultimate contract should not 
have been the 46,000, it should have been the 
forty-two one plus use of your crane? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And then that's what the agreement 
was between the two of you? 
A. Correct. 
18, Lines 1-12 
Q. Whatever the reasoning was, you don't 
recall right now; is that right? 
A. I don't recall. All I know is that a 
change order was written to him for $3900. 
because he was going to provide the crane. 
Q. Right. 
A. And ultimately we wound up providing 
the crane. 
Q. And in turn you intended to rescind 
the $3900 change order? 
A. Yes, Sharon had overlooked that. It 
never was rescinded. 
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3. In the affidavit of Traco's president, Tracy Bronson testifies concerning 
Comtrol's improper charges for the crane (R. at 283, Paragraph 4). He testified that he 
never agreed to a change order adding $9,520.00 in crane charges. 
4. Comtrol's statement of relevant facts numbers 21, 22 and 23 (Traco's Brief, 
Page 11) constitutes arguments of Comtrol which are not fact findings of the court and 
are disputed. 
5. Traco's president filed a deposition correction (R. at 606) and affidavit (R. 
at 604-605) clearly disputing the account balance claimed by Comtrol. 
Comtrol's brief does not specifically dispute the statements of fact as identified by 
Traco. Other discrepancies in the facts as stated by Comtrol do not appear to be material 
to the issues on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE MATERIAL EVIDENCE AS IT PERTAINS TO THE SPECIFIC 
ISSUES ON APPEAL HAS BEEN PROPERLY MARSHALED 
PURSUANT TO RULE 24(A) 9 OF THE UTAH RULES OF 
APPELLATE PROCEDURE. 
Traco's opening brief in this matter sufficiently marshaled the material facts in the 
manner contemplated under Rule 24(a) 9 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure so that 
this Court can properly determine whether the trial court's findings were clearly 
erroneous. Traco limited its appeal to specific narrow issues. When all material 
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evidence is viewed in a light most favorable to Comtrol and the trial court's ruling, there 
still is clear error in the standard the court applied in determining Comtrol's damages. 
Traco does not dispute that it has a procedural duty to marshal the evidence 
pertaining to disputed issues of fact as presented favorably to Comtrol and the court's 
findings. However, the duty of marshaling as a procedural rule specifically applies to 
the evidence pertaining to the issues on appeal so the Court can effect substantial justice. 
Traco marshaled the evidence using Comtrol's own exhibits, witnesses and the testimony 
of its president and payroll manager. The material parts of Comtrol's officer's testimony 
and Comtrol's damage exhibit were attached in the addendum to Traco's initial brief. 
Traco specifically identified all damages claimed by Comtrol including its costs, 
employee salaries, overhead and profit as testified by its own officers and attached 
Comtrol's damage exhibits as an addendum to its brief. This specific marshaling is 
discussed under the applicable issues in this brief. 
The issues involving contract interpretation are primarily questions of law to be 
determined under a standard of "correctness." However, the underlying contractual 
documents and relevant facts required for the court's determination of "correctness" have 
been appropriately marshaled for the Court's consideration as discussed under the 
specific issues in the remainder of this brief. 
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2. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY GRANTED DAMAGES 
DRAMATICALLY IN EXCESS OF THAT WHICH WOULD MAKE 
COMTROL WHOLE. 
A. Traco Properly Marshaled Evidence Pertaining to the 
Trial Court's Error in Awarding Excessive Damages. 
A primary issue at trial was whether Traco failed to complete two contracts after 
Traco claimed there was an anticipatory breach of contract by Comtrol's failure to pay 
for services rendered. The court found that issue in favor of Comtrol and awarded 
damages. In supporting Comtrol's claim for damages, Comtrol's president used a book 
entitled R.S. Means Building Construction Cost Data, which is a pamphlet sometimes 
used by contractors for bidding construction projects. The pamphlet contains 
recommended costs for construction companies across the nation. (Comtrol's Brief, Page 
35.) Traco asserted at trial that Comtrol's actual employee wages and equipment costs 
constituted the best evidence and should have been used to ascertain Comtrol's damages 
on this job rather than a national guide book used for bidding jobs generally. In awarding 
damages, the trial court used Comtrol's damage exhibit based on the R.S. Means 
pamphlet rather than Comtrol's actual costs as testified to by its officers. 
In Traco's initial brief, the following relevant evidence most favorable to 
Comtrol's position was marshaled and identified. 
a. Without expert testimony to provide foundation, Comtrol relied on a 
document entitled R.S. Means Building Construction Cost Data (Defendant's 
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Exhibit 79) for its damage exhibits. Said document provided recommendations for 
construction costs in the western United States to assist contractors in making bids. 
Using said catalog as a basis, Comtrol claimed the cost of skilled steel workers 
was $50.68 per hour. To this figure, Comtrol added an additional 10% overhead 
and 10% profit and charged Traco $60.82 for each hour of its employee's labor no 
matter what the skill level of the employee. This rate exceeded the pamphlet 
recommended amount (which included overhead and profit) for either a structural 
steelworker or a welder and substantially exceeds the hourly rate paid by Comtrol 
to its employees. (Traco's Brief Page 21, Paragraph 29; Traco's Brief, Page 20, 
Paragraph 25; Addendum C and D of Traco's Brief which are Comtrol's damage 
exhibits.) 
b. ~ The hourly rate of $50.68 together with overhead and profit ($60.82 
total) was charged for all of Comtrol's construction employees whether they were 
foremen or laborers. Most of the employees were not skilled steel workers. 
(Traco's Brief Page 20, Line 25 and Comtrol's Damage Exhibits 38 and 74 
attached to Traco's brief.) 
c. Comtrol's president and Comtrol's corporate treasurer (who was its 
payroll manager) testified that Comtrol's actual wages to its employees ranged 
from as low as $10 per hour for a laborer up to $30 for a foreman. (Traco's Brief 
on Page 20, Paragraph 26.) 
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d. Comtrol's payroll manager testified that Comtrol's labor burden for 
insurance payroll taxes, etc., averaged 35% of wages. (Traco's Brief, Pages 20 
and 21, Paragraph 26.) 
e. Comtrol's president testified that some of Comtrol's laborers and 
employees were paid as low as $10-$ 12 per hour. Higher paid laborers were paid 
$14-$15 per hour. (Traco's Brief Page 21, Paragraph 27.) 
f. Welding work was subcontracted to a skilled welder and 
steelworker, Jordan Johanson. Because he was a subcontractor and not an 
employee, he was paid $18.00 an hour, plus expenses for his welding torch 
charged at $10.50 an hour and the use of a company-owned truck. He paid his 
own labor burden. The other labor-type work was performed by Comtrol's regular 
employees. (Traco's Brief Pages 21-22, Paragraph 30.) 
g. On the same Utah Valley Project, Comtrol back charged another 
subcontractor (Dwamco) $35.00 per hour for the value of Comtrol's employees 
correcting Dwamco's work. (Traco's Brief Page 21, Paragraph 28.) 
h. Over objection, the trial court quashed Traco's subpoenas of payroll 
records and refused to allow introduction into evidence of actual payroll records 
which had been subpoenaed for trial. The court held that the records had not been 
requested during the discovery period. The subpoena was served on Comtrol on 
February 8th requiring payroll records of employees to be produced on March 3rd. 
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(R. at 819-823.) Traco claimed the payroll records were important as rebuttal 
evidence in order to refute testimony given at trial in late January. Comtrol had 
three weeks to produce the documents. This rebuttal evidence was significant 
because Comtrol's president Brian Burk's testimony as to damages was based on 
the R.S. Means pamphlet, which proposed wages that were inconsistent with the 
wages paid to Comtrol's employees. (Traco's Brief, Page 22, Paragraph 31.) 
i. The court's net judgment on the Weber State Project was $3,270.11 
after awarding $50,212.90 to Comtrol on its counterclaim for costs to complete 
Traco's work. Therefore, at the time of the claimed anticipatory breach, Comtrol 
owed Traco $46,942.39. (Traco's Brief Page 29, Table A.) 
j . The court's net judgment on the Utah Valley Project was $1,450.27 
after awarding $8,900.00 to Comtrol on its counterclaim for costs to complete 
Traco's work. Therefore, at the time of the claimed anticipatory breach, Comtrol 
owed Traco $7,449.73. In addition, Traco claimed Comtrol owed Traco at that 
time $16,723.00 for work performed refabricating steel. (Traco's Brief, Pages 29-
30.) 
On pages 35 and 36 of its reply brief, Comtrol lists several items it considers 
evidence which the court could have considered in determining damages. These included 
by example, costs of consumables and the fact that Comtrol did not get paid extra from 
the owner for completing the contract. However, those issues are included in the 10% 
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overhead and 10% profit Comtrol factored in above its employee wages and specific 
costs. Comtrol acknowledges it lacked the expertise of Traco in steel erection and 
therefore it took Comtrol longer to complete the work. Those arguments would have no 
bearing on which hourly rate should have been charged for Comtrol's work. Comtrol's 
additional fact considerations do not change the essential issue that Comtrol should not 
recover substantially beyond a sum necessary to make it whole. 
As suggested in Traco's initial brief, even if Comtrol's employees' hourly rates 
were calculated at the same hourly rate Comtrol paid its independent welder (Jordan 
Johanson), its damage claim would have been reduced by approximately half. Even that 
comparison lacks logic because Johanson, as a skilled steelworker, presumably was more 
efficient and effective than Comtrol's unskilled laborers. 
The written contracts between Comtrol and Traco provide for recovery of the 
actual cost incurred, including reasonable overhead and profit. Comtrol in its damage 
exhibit has requested overhead of 10% and profit 10% in addition to its costs. They 
should not now be able to change the terms of its contract by using a national average of 
costs rather than its own actual costs. If the parties had intended to use the R.S. Means 
pamphlet as a contractual basis for determining damages, they could have done so. Their 
contract provides that damages would be determined by actual costs not estimated bidding 
suggestions. (Comtrol's Exhibit 51; Comtrol's Exhibit 1, Paragraph 34.) 
In Automatic Control Products Corp. v. Tel-Tech, Inc., 780, P.2d 1258 (Utah 
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1989), in an action by a subcontractor against a contractor for items built pursuant to an 
oral contract, the Utah Supreme Court held that the trial court should have used those 
agreed-upon prices instead of relying on expert opinion to determine a reasonable and fair 
value. In the case at Bar, the same principal should apply. The Court should use actual 
costs and not bidding recommendations in estimating fair value. 
Cases discussing the law of damages generally hold that the court will attempt to 
place a non-breaching party in as good a position as if the contract had been performed. 
See for example, Saunders v. Sharp. 840 P.2d 796 (Utah 1992) and Christiansen v. 
Holiday Rent-A-Car, 845 P.2d 1316 (Utah App. 1992), certiorari denied 853 P.2d 897. It 
is certainly not intended that an injured party should receive benefits or be placed in a 
position more advantageous than what had been contracted. Fleming v. Scott. 348 P.2d 
701 (Colo. 1960); Christensen v. Christensen. 605 P.2d 80 (Idaho 1979). The Utah 
Supreme Court has also held that the desired objective is to evaluate any loss suffered by 
the most direct, practical and accurate method that can be employed. Even Odds, Inc. v. 
Nielson, 448 P..2d 709 (Utah 1968). 
To calculate damages in the manner proposed by Comtrol would have the effect of 
throwing the whole legal doctrine of provable damages into a state of confusion. For 
example, in a tort case, Comtrol's logic would allow average medical costs across the 
country or average costs of vehicle repair to become the standard rather than the actual 
costs incurred by the injured party. This would give parties an enormous incentive to 
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bring suits to recover substantial profits in excess of its actual damages incurred. Such a 
concept is repulsive to the legal system and is outside the scope of laws of damages. 
B. The Trial Court Erred in Determining the Anticipatory Breach 
of Contract by Comtrol Was Not Significant. 
Comtrol argues that the trial court correctly ruled that there was no anticipatory 
breach because at the time of any anticipatory breach the amount owing was an 
insignificant portion of the total contract. Traco does not dispute that an anticipatory 
breach must be a material breach of the contract. The material breach of contract needs to 
be based on the facts existing at the time the anticipatory breach occurs and not in 
hindsight after deducting all the offsetting costs subsequently incurred by Comtrol in 
completing the job. The trial court, in its conclusion of law #38, found that Traco was not 
justified in abandoning the Weber State Project because only $5,328.65 was owed to 
Traco at the time Comtrol took over completion of the work from Traco. This finding is 
inconsistent with the trial court's ultimate judgment awarding Comtrol a net judgment on 
the Weber State Project of $3,270.11 after offsetting $50,023.90 in back charges to 
complete Traco's work. Simple math indicates that based on the ultimate judgment, 
Comtrol owed Traco $46,753.79 at the time Comtrol commenced to complete Traco's 
work. That is a significant amount for a small one owner business. Comtrol's president 
knew Traco needed regular draws in order to meet its payroll. (Testimony of Brian Burk, 
R.at942L.22 and 944, 3-19.) 
In its conclusion of law 21 and 22, the court found that Traco was not justified in 
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terminating its work on the Utah Valley Project because at the time of Traco's 
termination, the amount owing from Comtrol to Traco was only $6,611.51 which the 
court considered insignificant. On the Utah Valley Project, the court found a net 
judgment for Comtrol of $1,450.27 after deducting an $8,900 cost of completion. If it is 
determined that Comtrol should have paid Traco for the work Traco performed in 
repairing the fabrication errors of Dwamco in the amount of $16,723.00, then prior to 
Comtrol taking over Traco's work on the Utah Valley Job, Comtrol would have owed 
Traco a total of $24,172.73. Additionally, that sum had been owing for approximately 
four months while Traco was unable to work on the project waiting for Comtrol to have 
railings re-manufactured. (Statement of Fact 21; Traco's Brief Pages 18-19.) 
Considered together, at the point in time when Comtrol ultimately refused to pay 
Traco anticipated draws (January 2, 2002), Comtrol owed Traco over $70,000 on the 
Weber and Utah Valley projects. This was not an insignificant amount when considering 
the issue of an anticipatory breach. The concept of anticipatory breach is intended to 
protect a party from abuses of unfair leverage arising from failure of a party to pay for 
contracted services. Traco was placed in the untenable position of not being able to 
continue the job because it was not being paid and therefore was unable to pay its 
employees. 
If an anticipatory breach occurred, then Comtrol's damage award should be 
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modified to delete profits which were awarded above actual costs incurred1. Traco 
respectfully requests this Court to remand the case to the trial court to redetermine 
Comtrol's damages on the basis of actual wages paid and costs incurred by Comtrol 
rather than relying on industry averages. 
3. SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ISSUES INVOLVING THE ARMY 
RESERVE CONTRACT WAS INAPPROPRIATE BECAUSE THERE 
WERE FACTUAL DISPUTES INVOLVING (A) WHETHER THERE 
WAS AN AGREEMENT FOR AN ACCORD AND SATISFACTION 
SUPPORTED BY CONSIDERATION; AND (B) WHETHER THERE 
WAS A UNILATERAL OR MUTUAL MISTAKE AS TO A 
CONTRACT BALANCE. 
The crux of the Army Reserve contract dispute arises from the initial contract 
wherein Traco was to be paid $42,100.00 if Comtrol provided the crane or $46,000.00 if 
Traco provided the crane. Comtrol furnished the crane and then charged Traco an 
additional $9,520.00 for crane usage. Comtrol's president, Brian Burk, acknowledges 
there were mistakes made in the process of charging for the crane usage as quoted 
previously on Page 4 of this brief. (R at 1053 page 17 line 19 to page 18 line 12.) Traco 
refused to sign a change order agreeing to the wrongfully assessed crane charge. A few 
days later, Comtrol presented a new change order reducing the contract by $850.00 for 
xSee Miller Pontiac, Inc. v. Osborne. 622 P.2d 800 (Utah 1981), which excludes 
profits as an element of damages. 
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work which Comtrol had voluntarily performed itself several months earlier. Traco's 
president signed the $850.00 back charge without noticing that Comtrol had reduced the 
contract balance to incorporate the disputed back charge. This balance error was not 
observed until after his deposition was taken. He corrected his deposition and filed an 
affidavit identifying the incorrect balance on the back charge. 
The trial court granted summary judgment despite many factual questions that 
were never addressed by the court. No findings were entered by the court despite highly 
contradictory testimony between the affidavit of Traco's president and the affidavit of 
Comtrol. Traco asserts that even if it had known the change order contained an erroneous 
balance, the elements for an accord and satisfaction were not met. There was not a 
meeting of the minds on a new contract and there was no valid consideration given to 
Traco for an accord and satisfaction. 
Comtrol cites the case of S&G, Inc. v. Intermtn Power Agency, 913 P.2d 735 
(Utah 1996) as its principal Utah case on the issues of accord and satisfaction. That case 
required the acceptance of payment of additional sums or meaningful concessions as 
consideration for the accord and satisfaction. There was no additional payment made to 
Traco or concessions given to Traco in consideration of Traco accepting a $13,345.00 
reduction in the contract balance. 
The last payment by Comtrol to Traco was made many months earlier. The only 
other adjustment on the account was a decrease in a payment of $850.00 owed Traco by 
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Comtrol. Traco certainly did not receive any new consideration and made no agreement 
to repay Comtrol overpaid sums. Comtrol, in trying to stretch for an element of 
consideration, claims that Comtrol's rescission of an $850.00 change order (R. at 200) 
relieved Traco of a responsibility. That was not the case because months earlier Comtrol 
had voluntarily performed services under a prior change order and withdrew from Traco 
the opportunity to perform and be paid for said services. There was simply no new 
consideration for the accord and satisfaction. 
The cases cited by Comtrol do not change the basic elements of contract law 
including the need for consideration as essential elements of accord and satisfaction. 
Comtrol did not even assert a claim that Traco was overpaid until its counterclaim was 
filed years later. The existence of issues of lack of consideration, mistake and accord 
and satisfaction require an evidentiary hearing. 
4. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT 
SERVICES RENDERED BY TRACO IN COMPLETING THE 
WORK OF ANOTHER SUBCONTRACTOR (DWAMCO) DID NOT 
ARISE UNDER EITHER A CONTRACT WITH COMTROL OR 
WITH DWAMCO OR OUTSIDE OF THE SCOPE OF THE 
ORIGINAL COMTROL CONTRACT. 
The parties acknowledge that in order to proceed towards completion of Traco's 
contract with Comtrol on the Utah Valley Project, fabrication corrections had to be made 
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on the product delivered by the steel fabricator, Dwamco. Comtrol claims that Traco 
contracted directly with Dwamco to make corrections in Dwamco's fabricated product. 
Dwamco and Traco both claimed no such contract existed and the court found 
accordingly and dismissed Dwamco from the case. (R. at 729-733.) Dwamco had 
initially been included as a party to the lawsuit because Comtrol had previously requested 
Traco to change its billing from Comtrol to Dwamco as an accommodation to Comtrol. 
(R. at 107 L. 17 to R. 1008 Line 16; Traco's Exhibit 108.) 
The trial court determined by summary judgment that there was not a contract 
between Dwamco and Traco to correct steel fabrication errors. At the trial, the court 
inconsistently held that any contract to correct Dwamco's errors was between Traco and 
Dwamco because there was not a contract between Comtrol and Traco to correct 
Dwamco's steel fabrication errors. The court's ruling was based on the fact that change 
orders had not been signed by Comtrol's officers directing Traco to correct Dwamco's 
errors. Traco performed these services correcting steel fabrication errors of Dwamco 
under instructions from Comtrol's Superintendent, which contract which was outside the 
scope of the original Traco-Comtrol contract and subject to basic rules of contract 
construction. 
In its initial brief, Traco marshaled evidence necessary for the Court to determine 
whether there was a separate oral contract to correct Dwamco's fabrication errors. 
Comtrol's superintendent requested Traco to perform fabrication services out of concern 
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of liquidated damages or other potential sanctions. (R. at 1050, Page 1065; R. at 1050, 
Page 1102, Lines 3-15; R. at 1050, Page 1105, Lines 15-19.) The pertinent facts include 
the following: 
a. Traco asserted it was entitled to at least $16,723.00 in 
additional fees for services rendered correcting (Dwamco's) misfabricated 
steel. (Traco's Brief, Page 18, Paragraph 17.) 
b. The trial court found that Traco could not recover payment 
against Comtrol for its services rendered to make fabrication corrections on 
the Utah Valley Project because Traco had not submitted written change 
order requests timely, the change order requests had not been approved in 
writing by the president or vice president of Comtrol, or they were 
otherwise waived by Traco. Traco claimed that because the additional 
services were rendered outside of the scope of the original contract, they 
constituted a separate contract authorized by Comtrol's superintendent. 
(Traco's Brief, Page 18, Paragraph 19.) 
c. When the fabrication errors were discovered, Traco made 
corrections as directed by Comtrol's superintendent. Traco did not have a 
contractual agreement with Dwamco. The trial court had previously ruled 
in a prior motion for partial summary judgment that there was no contract 
between Traco and Dwamco. Traco incorporated into its initial brief the 
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court's findings of fact numbers 26, 27 and 28 which found favorably for 
Comtrol that Traco's contract was with "Dwamco." Those findings were 
diametrically opposed to the court's summary judgment ruling in this case 
when it held that there was no contractual relationship between Traco and 
Dwamco. (Traco's Brief, Page 43; Finding of Fact #27; R. at 906.) 
d. Repairs had to be made on Dwamco's fabricated products 
before Traco could proceed in performing erection services. Traco was 
hired only to erect finished steel products. Making repairs resulting from 
manufacturing errors of the fabricator was not part of its contract. 
Dwamco was not in a position to make the necessary repairs on its 
fabricated products. Traco was requested by Comtrol's superintendent to 
make repairs on the products manufactured by Dwamco in order that Traco 
could complete its work. Traco's president and foreman both testified that 
they were directed to proceed with repairs by Comtrol. Eugene Cook, 
Comtrol's superintendent, acknowledged that on occasion Traco was 
directed to proceed and make corrections on products rather than delay the 
job. (Traco's Brief at Page 43; Testimony of Cook, R. at 1050, Page 1105, 
Line 7 to Line 24; Bronson testimony, R. at 1046, Pages 77-106.) 
e. Comtrol's president acknowledged that this procedure 
sometimes happens even though it is contrary to the company policies. 
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(Traco's Brief at Page 44; Testimony of Comtrol President, Brian Burk, R. 
at 1050, Page 1030, Line 9 to Pagel033, Line 16.) 
Fabrication work was outside the scope of Traco's contract to provide erection 
services. Traco could not proceed with its installation work without having proper 
fabricated steel. Direction by Comtrol's superintendent to Traco to correct the steel 
fabrication problem constituted a completely separate contract which was not subject to 
the same requirements for change orders as existed in the contract pertaining to steel 
erection. Traco Steel relied upon the direction of Comtrol's job superintendent in 
correcting those fabrication errors. 
The original contract between Traco and Comtrol gave the right to put the 
responsibility on Comtrol to add or subtract from the scope of contractor's work. (R. at 
899; Finding of Fact #2, Paragraph. 26; Defendant's Exhibit 66, Paragraph 24; pertinent 
language quoted in Comtrol's Brief, Page 5, Paragraph 26.) Comtrol did not choose to 
enlarge the scope of the contract under this option. Instead, Comtrol requested Traco 
verbally to perform fabrication duties. Therefore, services performed by Traco to correct 
fabrication errors constituted a separate contract subject to laws of contract construction. 
The court erred in finding that Traco's services refabricating steel manufactured by 
Dwamco required a written change order to be signed by Comtrol's president or vice 
president because said work was outside the scope of the original contract. Under a 
separate contract, Comtrol's agent (its superintendent) could bind his principal and direct 
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Traco to perform and make the corrections on the fabricated steel. (R. at Pages 285-286.) 
The court denied recovery to Traco because there was not a written contract or 
written change order which allowed Traco to recover from Comtrol for performing 
Dwamco's duties. Traco maintains that an entirely separate oral contract was created in 
order to correct errors in fabricated steel which was an essential pre-requisite before 
Traco could erect the steel. Comtrol should not be allowed to exercise its leverage and 
put pressure on Traco to perform work under Dwamco's contract and then decline 
payment. Certainly, Traco did not perform over $17,000 of work gratuitously. 
This court has held that "Parties to a written agreement may not only enter into 
separate, subsequent agreements, but they may also orally modify or abandon a written 
agreement subsequent to entering into the initial written agreement, even if the agreement 
being modified or abandoned unambiguously indicates that any modification must be in 
writing." Harris v. IES Associates. Inc.. 2003 UT App.l 12, 69 P.3d 297. 
Traco requests that this Court reverse the trial court's interpretation of the Traco-
Comtrol contract and determine that a separate contract existed between Comtrol and 
Traco pertaining to correcting Dwamco's steel fabrication errors. 
5. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION AND 
APPLICATION OF INTERIM LIEN WAIVERS. 
The pertinent facts as to this issue were stated in Traco's brief on Page 23, 
Paragraph 34 and in the court's findings of fact 19 and 46 read as follows: 
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"During the course of each contract, Traco periodically signed lien 
releases in exchange for partial payments. The court found that the lien 
releases waived any claim for payment for services rendered prior to their 
effective date. The court rejected Traco's position that the lien releases 
only applied to the dollar portion of the contract payment paid and did not 
apply to specific work performed or unpaid residual payments. (Traco's 
Brief, Page 23.)" 
Findings of Fact: 
"19. On May 30, 2001, Traco executed a Subcontractor Lien 
Waiver that waived and released Traco's right to any claims for labor and 
materials provided to the UVSC project on or before April 30, 2001. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 63.) This release was in exchange for Comtrol's 
payment of $56,923.05 to Traco, which payment was made by Comtrol via 
Check No. 41375, thus rendering the release fully effective. (Finding of 
Fact 19; Defendant's Exhibit 78.) 
46. On October 17, 2001, Traco executed a Subcontractor Lien 
Waiver that waived and released Traco's rights to any claims for labor and 
materials provided to the Weber State Project on or before August 31, 2001. 
(Defendant's Exhibit 12.) This Lien Release was in exchange for 
Comtrol's payment of $18,054.00, which payment was made by Comtrol 
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via Check No. 42279, rendering the Release effective. (Finding of Fact 46; 
Defendant's Exhibit 63.)" 
Copies of the lien releases are attached hereto as Addendum "A". (Exhibits 12 and 63.) 
A question of contract interpretation exists pertaining to the effect of the interim 
lien waivers. Traco does not deny the interim lien waivers were signed and that interim 
payments were received. Since the contract was ongoing, retentions were still to be paid 
and additional work was expected to be performed. A question exists as to whether the 
interim lien releases constituted a release of specific work performed or only a partial 
release of lien to the extent of monies paid. 
Do the lien waivers bar future retained payments or payment for specific aspects of 
work performed? The trial court held that recovery could not be made for any work 
performed by Traco prior to the effective date of the lien release. However, what work 
had been performed was not clearly defined in the lien waiver and certainly did not 
include retainages. Whether the lien waiver waives only the dollar amount against the 
contract or specific elements of the overall contact is an issue that the Court has been 
asked to review for "correctness." 
CONCLUSION 
The Court is respectfully requested to reverse the trial court's decision in the 
manner requested in Traco's initial brief and remand the case to the trial court for a 
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determination of judgment and attorney fees consistent with the Court's rulings in 
matter. 
Dated this ff day of June, 2007. 
Ralph R. Tate, Jr. 
Attorney for Appellant 
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ADDENDUM J 
Defendant's Exhibits 12 and 63 
Lien Waivers 
^f COMTROL, Inc. 
P.O. BOX 428 / Ml OVALE. UTAH 84047 (801)561-2263 / FAX (801) 561-2305 
SUBCONTRACTOR LIEN WAIVER 
The undefsigned, in consideration of the premises arid upon payment 
to the below sloried subcontractor or to my suppliers and/aij Subcontractors, 
of the sum of $L8,054.00 paid by Comtrol, Inc., herebylyaives and 
releases all rights to a mechanic's lien, payment bond, conlijact or other 
tlaims now existing, or that may hereafter arise for labor and materials 
furnished on or before August 3 1 , 2001 to the constructiln project known 
jjs ETHEL WATJTIS KIMBALL VISUAL ART CENTER, locJtJed at WEBER 
STATE UNIVERSITY, OGDEN, UTAH. 
The undeiteigned certifies that all businesses or pers 
Jabor and materials to the construction project have been 
faonies furnished as consideration for this Waiver of Lien a 
Undersigned further agrees to indemnify OWNER and CON 
£ny and all claims and costs, Including attorney's fees, for 
$ood and sufficient Waiver of Lien for such person, corpor; 
iinder the contract with the undersigned. 
nel furnishing 
ly paid with the 
I Claims. The 
jffcACTOR from 
ilure to supply a 
on, etc., working 
DATED this f t day of. 2001. 
Traco Steel Inc. 
COMPANY NAME 
\ u r 0 M M I 02:4Owr frcarCOVTWi. l»C 
j j f COMTROMnc. 
P,0,VQXAZ* / MIDVALE, UTAH M047 / («01) StVttt t / FAX (501) 561-2305 
SUBCONTRACTOR LIEN WAIVER 
iKlt 
The undersigned, In consideration of the premises and upon payment 
to the below signed subcontractor or to my suppliers and/or subcontractors, 
of the sum of $56,923.05 paid by Comtrol, Inc., hereby waives and 
releases all rights to a mechanic's lien, payment bond, contract or other 
claims now existing, or that may hereafter arise for labor and materials 
furnished on or before April 30, 2001 to the construction project known as 
UTAH VALLEY STATE COLLEGE STUDENT CENTER EXPANSION, located 
at OREM, UTAH. 
The undersigned certifies that all businesses or personnel furnishing 
labor and materials to the construction project have been fully paid with the 
monies furnished as consideration for this Waiver of Uen and Claims. The 
undersigned further agrees to indemnify OWNER and CONTRACTOR from 
any and all claims and costs, Including attorney's fees, for failure to supply a 
good and sufficient Waiver of Uen for such person, corporation, etc., working 
under the contract with the undersigned. 
DATED this 7tf day of 2001. 
Traco Steel Inc. 
COMPANY NAME 
>-Q£f? 
COM 0339 
